Wills, Trusts, and Estates by Gray, J. William, Jr. & Ramsey, Katherine E.
University of Richmond Law Review 
Volume 50 Issue 1 Article 9 
11-1-2015 
Wills, Trusts, and Estates 
J. William Gray Jr. 
Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia 
Katherine E. Ramsey 
Hunton & Williams, LLP, Richmond, Virginia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. W. Gray Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 199 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu. 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. William Gray, Jr. *
Katherine E. Ramsey **
INTRODUCTION
The inactivity of Virginia's General Assembly and state courts
in the area of wills, trusts, and estates, noted in this summary in
2014,' continued this year. Legislation was generally limited to
clarifications and technical corrections to existing laws on such
subjects as creditor protection for certain trust assets, access to
digital assets, qualification of personal representatives, and dis-
position of dead bodies. Three cases dealt with the doctrine of
survivorship for administrators, interpretation of shareholder
agreements, and the period for seeking removal of an executor.
I. LEGISLATION2
A. Creditor Protection for Former Entireties Property Held in
Trust
Property held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entire-
ties has long enjoyed protection against the claims of one spouse's
creditors.' In 2000, the General Assembly extended that creditor
protection to a principal family residence that a husband and wife
held as tenants by the entireties and subsequently transferred in-
to their joint or separate trusts:
* Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1977, University of
Virginia; B.S.I.E., B.A., 1973, Rutgers University.
** Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1998, University of
Virginia; M.S., 1988, Boston University; B.A., 1986, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University.
1. J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 211, 211 (2014).
2. All 2015 legislation summarized in this article became effective July 1, 2015.
3. See, e.g., Ford v. Poston (In re Ford), 53 B.R. 444, 447-48 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984),
affd, 773 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1985).
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The principal family residence of a husband and wife that is held by
them as tenants by the entireties and conveyed to their joint revoca-
ble or irrevocable trust, or in equal shares to their separate revocable
or irrevocable trusts, shall have the same immunity from the claims
of their separate creditors as it would if it had remained a tenancy
by the entirety, so long as (i) they remain husband and wife, (ii) it
continues to be held in the trust or trusts, and (iii) it continues to be
their principal family residence.4
This legislation was intended to help Virginia couples plan
their estates without fear of exposing their home to the claims of
their separate creditors.5 In 2006, the General Assembly sought to
give married couples even more flexibility in their planning by ex-
tending the new exemption to any type of property held as ten-
ants by the entireties and eliminating the requirement that, if
conveyed to separate trusts, it must be divided equally.! Unfortu-
nately, the amendments created significant uncertainty. For ex-
ample, the revised statute protected the couple's property after its
transfer into trust so long as it "continues to be their property."7
Since legal title vested in the trustee or trustees after the trans-
fer, this language seems to have referred to the spouses' benefi-
cial interests in the property.8 Even if that were the case, it was
unclear whether the trust could have beneficiaries other than the
spouses; it was also unclear whether the proceeds would be pro-
tected from creditors if a trustee later sold the property, or
whether the trustee could waive the creditor protection.9 Despite
this confusion, some practitioners were quick to take advantage
of the new exemption. Others, however, feared risking their cli-
ents' creditor protection if a court were to interpret the statute in
an unexpected manner."
Following nine years of uncertainty, the General Assembly sig-
nificantly rewrote the statute in 2015." It clarified that the spe-
4. Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 331, 2000 Va. Acts 473, 474 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
5. J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 41
U. RICH. L. REv. 321, 324 (2006).
6. Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 281, 2006 Va. Acts 356, 356 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-20.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
8. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 325.
9. Id. at 325-26.
10. Id. at 326 ("[lit is doubtful whether the prudent estate planner will act upon this
new provision until its operation has been clarified by further legislation.").
11. See Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 424, 2015 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
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cial creditor protection (i) existed notwithstanding the general
rule that trust assets remain subject to the claims of the settlor's
creditors and (ii) extended to proceeds from the sale or disposition
of the former entireties property.12 A new safe harbor ensures pro-
tection if:
[B]oth spouses are current beneficiaries of one trust that holds the
entire property or each spouse is a current beneficiary of a separate
trust and the two separate trusts together hold the entire property,
whether or not other persons are also current or future beneficiaries
of the trust or trusts.
The trustee may waive the statutory immunity as to any specific
creditor, including a separate creditor of either spouse, or as to
any specifically described property if the trust instrument ex-
pressly grants the power or both spouses consent in writing.4
To avoid a possible cloud on prior transfers, the 2015 amend-
ments also apply to tenancy by the entireties' property that a
husband and wife15 transferred into trust under the prior stat-
ute.'6
B. Digital Assets
As recently as twenty years ago, a decedent's intangible per-
sonal property was almost always limited to bank accounts,
stocks, insurance, royalties, contract rights, and other assets that
were evidenced through written statements, agreements, certifi-
cates, and the like. The personal representative had only to
search through the decedent's possessions and mail and then pre-
sent a valid qualification letter to third parties in order to obtain
§ 55-20.2(B) (Supp. 2015)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. In an opinion to the Clerk of the Fairfax County Circuit Court, the Attorney Gen-
eral of Virginia concluded that the decision in Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D.
Va. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 308 (2014), requires clerks of court to interpret the term "husband and wife" in Vir-
ginia Code section 58.1-810.3, relating to recordation tax exemptions, to include spouses of
the same sex. 2014 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 199, 199. A footnote in that opinion declares further
that the terms "husband and wife," "man and wife," "wife," and "husband," wherever used
in the Virginia Code, must be read to apply equally to all legal marriages. Id. at 202 n.14.
16. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 424, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-20.2(B) (Supp. 2015)).
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the necessary information to gain control over and administer the
estate. Today, however, these methods can be insufficient. Many
decedents maintain at least some online presence, using cloud
storage for their photographs and important documents and con-
ducting many types of business exclusively in electronic, rather
than paper, form. Unless the personal representative has access
to these documents, accounts, and records after the decedent's
death, sentimental or valuable information could be lost and it
may be difficult to administer the decedent's estate completely
and efficiently. 7
To address this problem, at least in part, the 2013 General As-
sembly enacted a bill that allowed the personal representative of
a deceased minor domiciled in Virginia to assume the minor's
terms of service agreement for any digital account for purposes of
consenting to and obtaining disclosure of the contents of commu-
nications and subscriber records.8 The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also promulgated the
broader Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act in 2014.19
This model act would grant personal representatives of estates
and other fiduciaries the same access to digital assets as they
have always had to more traditional assets, unless the account
holder instructs otherwise.° Unfortunately, the act faced stiff op-
position from various digital-industry players who primarily cited
privacy concerns.2 1
In the face of the industry's objections, the 2015 General As-
sembly declined to adopt the model act and instead supplemented
the limited 2013 statute with the industry-approved "Privacy Ex-
pectation Afterlife and Choices Act" ("PEAC").22 This act provides
17. See, e.g., J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 189, 198 (2013); UNIF. FIDUCIARY
ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/Fiduciary%2OAccess%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014_UFADAAFinal.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015) [hereinafter ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT].
18. Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 369, 2013 Va. Acts 615, 615 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
64.2-109 to -110 (Supp. 2014)); see also Gray & Ramsey, supra note 17, at 198.
19. See ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT, supra note 17.
20. See id.
21. See Letter from Tammy Cota, Exec. Dir. of the Internet Coal., to the Hon. Eric
Coleman and the Hon. William Tong, Co-Chairs of the Joint Judiciary Comm., Conn. Gen.
Assembly (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/JUDdata/Tmy/2015SB-00979-R000
306-Cota,%2OTammy-TMY.PDF (last visited on Oct. 1, 2015).
22. See Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 657, 2015 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
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a set of rules that apply only to personal representatives of dece-
dents' estates and not to trustees, guardians, committees, or oth-
er types of fiduciaries.23 It establishes a procedure by which a per-
sonal representative may request records pertaining to the
decedent's use of a digital account or the actual contents of that
account.24 The act applies to all forms of digital accounts, includ-
ing blogs, email, multimedia, personal and social networking ac-
counts, and comparable items "as technology develops."25
To gain access to the decedent's user records with respect to
any digital account, the personal representative must first file a
motion asking the court in which he or she is qualified to order
the service provider to disclose such records for the eighteen-
month period ending on the decedent's date of death.26 The court's
order may go further back than eighteen months if necessary for
the proper administration of the decedent's estate.27 The dece-
dent's heirs or beneficiaries and the service provider are not enti-
tled to notice of the motion.2 s
The personal representative's motion must include an affidavit
attesting, upon information and belief, that:
§§ 64.2-109 to -115 (Cum. Supp. 2015)); Letter from Tammy Cota, supra note 21 (urging
the adoption of the Privacy Expectation Afterlife and Choices Act in lieu of the Uniform
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act); UNIF. LAW COMM'N, UNIFORM TRUST AND ESTATE
ACTS: REPORT TO NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES 2-3
(2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real-property-trust-estate/nc
lcf/2015 06/nclcf 2015_06_02_uniformtrust_and_estateactsjune_2015_reportto.nclcf.
authcheckdam.pdf (noting that the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act died in
committee in Virginia) (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-100 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cune. Supp. 2015) (elaborating
on what constitutes a personal representative); Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 657, 2015 Va.
Acts _, _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-109 to -115 (Cum. Supp. 2015)) (noting that
the definition of personal representative mirrors the definition found in section 64.2-100).
24. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 657, 2015 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
64.2-109 to -115 (Cum. Supp. 2015)). The General Assembly instructed the Joint Commis-
sion on Technology and Science to "develop legislative recommendations to address access
to electronic communication records and digital account content by guardians ad litem,
conservators, and other fiduciaries." Id.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-109 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
26. Id. § 64.2-111(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
27. Id. § 64.2-111(C) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
28. Id. § 64.2-111(D) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
2015]
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" The user is deceased;
* The user was a subscriber or customer of the service pro-
vider;
" The account has been reasonably identified so as to enable
the service provider to definitively identify the user;
* All other authorized users, if any, have expressly consented
in written or electronic form to the disclosure;
" The request is "tailored to effectuate the purpose of" the es-
tate's administration; and
" The request does not conflict with the decedent's will, if
any.
29
If the personal representative wishes to obtain the actual con-
tents of the decedent's electronic communications or records, the
affidavit must also include an attestation that the decedent af-
firmatively consented to their disclosure through a provision in
his or her will or an account setting or election with the provid-
er.'° It seems unlikely that many wills drafted before 2015 will
contain this consent, and therefore PEAC effectively forecloses
the possibility of accessing the contents of a decedent's electronic
communications or records in such cases.
Whether seeking the decedent's account records or actual con-
tents, the personal representative must send the court's order to
the provider, along with a copy of the consent of any joint owners,
the death certificate and, if applicable, the provision in the will
consenting to the disclosure of the electronic communications or
account contents."' This additional documentation requirement
seems unnecessary, since the same documentation will have been
filed with the court in support of the personal representative's
original motion seeking the order. Even if not, the personal repre-
sentative will have filed, under penalty of perjury, his or her affi-
davit that such documentation exists. On the other hand, if the
service provider is allowed to make its own determination as to
whether the documentation is sufficient before complying with
29. Id. § 64.2-111(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
30. Id. § 64.2-111(B) (Cum. Supp. 2015). "Contents" is defined to mean any infor-
mation concerning the substance, purport or meaning, including its subject line, of a com-
munication. Id. § 64.2-109 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
31. Id. § 64.2-111(A), (B) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
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the order, then the delay and cost of the court proceeding hardly
seems necessary other than as additional protection for the ser-
vice provider, and possibly as a deterrent to de minimis requests.
Even when presented with the requisite court order and sup-
porting documentation, the service provider must disclose the
contents of electronic communications or records only "to the ex-
tent reasonably available."2 The service provider may also refuse
to provide the decedent's user records or to disclose the contents
of any account if doing so would violate any applicable state or
federal law.3 In addition, a provider may file a motion to quash
within sixty days after receiving the order if the deceased user af-
firmatively elected not to disclose the records or content or delet-
ed them during his or her lifetime, if any of the facts in the affi-
davit regarding the decedent-user are not true, or if the provider
can show by clear and convincing evidence that complying with
the order would "create an undue burden upon the provider.""
Upon receiving an order directing the release of the user's rec-
ords or the contents of any account, the service provider may noti-
fy the account of the request and provide any authorized users a
"reasonable time" to object to the disclosure." This appears to be
true even if those users gave their consent to the personal repre-
sentative before the original motion and affidavit were filed. If an
authorized user objects to the disclosure, it will then be up to the
personal representative to apply to the court for "appropriate re-
lief. ,
36
The hurdles PEAC places in the path of personal representa-
tives presume that the right to privacy is somehow greater with
respect to digital assets than to non-digital communications and
records or other intangible assets. There is no question that a
personal representative may take possession and review the de-
cedent's diary, old love letters, legal file, medical records, and
other potentially sensitive information in hard-copy form. Alt-
hough an individual may reasonably expect that his or her priva-
cy will be preserved during lifetime, the individual also knows
32. Id. § 64.2-111(B) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
33. Id. § 64.2-111(E) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
34. Id. § 64.2-112(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
35. Id. § 64.2-113 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
36. Id.
2015]
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that he or she must take additional steps to destroy or secure any
items he or she does not wish for others to view after death. This
is the approach taken by the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital
Assets Act, but rejected by Virginia's legislature in the face of in-
dustry opposition.37 One can only hope that in time the public will
demand a better alternative than PEAC. Until then, the admin-
istration of estates that include digital assets will require more
time and expense in nearly every case, and some assets may nev-
er be available to executors.
C. Liability of Real Estate for Decedent's Debts and Expenses
If a decedent's personal property is insufficient to pay the dece-
dent's debts and lawful demands against the estate, the dece-
dent's real estate becomes liable for any remaining debts and de-
mands.38 An heir or devisee who has sold the real estate is still
liable for its value, with interest, to persons entitled to be paid
out of the real estate.39 The real estate itself is exonerated, how-
ever, if (i) more than one year has passed since the decedent's
death, (ii) the conveyance was bona fide, and (iii) no action has
been commenced for administration of the real estate and no re-
port of debts and demands has been filed at the time of sale." If
the conveyance takes place within one year after the decedent's
death, it will be invalid against the decedent's creditors if an ad-
ministration action is commenced or a report of debts and de-
mands is filed within that one-year period, unless the conveyance
is pursuant to a court decree and the net proceeds are paid to a
special commissioner to be held until the one-year period expires,
or unless the heir or devisee posts bond with surety.1
Prior to the 2015 change, the statute appeared to exempt not
only the real estate conveyed but also the heir or devisee person-
ally from liability for the decedent's unpaid debts and demands
against the estate.2
37. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-532 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
39. Id. § 64.2-534 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 64.2-534(C) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
42. Compare id. § 64.2-534 (Repl. Vol. 2012), with id. (Cum. Supp. 2015).
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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
D. Suitability for Service as Estate Administrator
A court or clerk may not grant administration over an estate in
Virginia to any person unless satisfied that the person is suitable
and competent to perform the duties of the office.4" To that end, a
new statute requires anyone seeking to qualify as administrator
of an intestate estate to sign under oath that he or she is not un-
der a disability and "has not been convicted of a felony offense of
(i) fraud or misrepresentation or (ii) robbery, extortion, burglary,
larceny, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, perjury, bribery,
treason, or racketeering."" Although the implication is that a fel-
ony conviction disqualifies an individual from serving as an ad-
ministrator, the statute does not expressly make felons ineligible;
rather, it expressly allows a felon who is the sole distributee of an
estate to serve as administrator if the court or clerk determines
that the felon is "otherwise suitable and competent to perform the
duties of his office."" A similar affidavit is not required for any
individual seeking to qualify as executor or administrator with
the will annexed under Virginia Code section 64.2-500.4
E. Administrator for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death Action
In cases where an individual seeks qualification only for the
purpose of prosecuting or defending a personal injury or wrongful
death action involving the decedent, the appointment cannot be
made until at least sixty days after the decedent's death, and
then only if no other personal representative has been appointed
for the estate.47 The court or the commissioner of accounts may
exempt any such administrator from the duty to file accountings,
so long as he or she is not administering funds and has no power
of sale over any real estate.48
43. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-500(B), -502(D) (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2015).
44. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 551, 2015 Va. Acts l, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-502(D) (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
45. Id.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-500 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2015).
47. Act of Mar. 16, 2015, chs. 124, 129 & 130, 2015 Va. Acts __, - (codified as amend-
ed at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-454 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
48. Act of Mar. 16, 2015, chs. 129 & 130, 2015 Va. Acts __, - (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-606(G) (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
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F. Qualification Certificate for Small Asset Estate
When any personal representative, guardian, or other fiduciary
seeks to qualify to administer a small estate, the court or clerk
has long been authorized to permit the fiduciary to qualify with-
out surety.49 This priviledge currently is available to estates val-
ued at $25,000 or less.5  Now, though, the court or clerk in such
cases must also issue a special certificate of qualification, titled
"Qualification Certificate for Small Asset Estate," which states on
its face that the maximum amount of assets that may be collected
pursuant to the certificate is $25,000."'
The certificate must bear the impression seal of the court
clerk12 and state in a prominent position on the front that anyone
may deliver to the named fiduciary assets that are valued at no
more than $25,000 on the date of delivery.53 The certificate also
must state that it "(i) may be used only once, (ii) is not effective if
it does not have impression seal of the court clerk and therefore
photocopies ... are not effective, and (iii) must be retained by the
payor."54
When presented with a Qualification Certificate for Small As-
set Estate, the person holding the asset may deliver it to the
named fiduciary if the asset has a value on the date of delivery of
no more than $25,000.5' The holder will not be liable for turning
over assets that he or she believes in good faith to be valued at
$25,000 or less, or for refusing to turn over assets he or she be-
lieves in good faith to have a value of more than $25,000.56 Assets
held in a safe deposit box are not counted toward the $25,000 lim-
it; the lessor of the box is not deemed to know of, and has no obli-
gation to determine, the contents of the box or their value.57
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1411(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (permitting administration
without surety for amounts of $15,000 or less); id. (Cum. Supp. 2014) (raising the maxi-
mum amount permitted to be administered without surety to $25,000).
50. See id. (Cum. Supp. 2015).
51. Id. § 64.2-1411(C) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 64.2-1411(D) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Following delivery, the holder of the assets will be discharged
and released from all claims or liabilities for the delivery and
need not see to the fiduciary's use of the assets or ask what assets
the fiduciary may have received from other sources.8 However,
the holder must retain the original certificate of qualification
from the fiduciary, which will prevent the fiduciary from using it
again to obtain possession of additional assets without the clerk's
knowledge.9 Accordingly, if the fiduciary needs to collect assets
from more than one source, he or she will have to request addi-
tional certificates.
The clerk will not be liable for any misrepresentations made by
the person or persons seeking to qualify under the small asset es-
tate exemption or for the performance of any of the clerk's duties
relating to it, unless the clerk was grossly negligent or engaged in
intentional misconduct."
This new procedure should offer additional protection to bene-
ficiaries by preventing individuals from qualifying without surety
on the basis of a false representation of the estate's value.
G. Expansion of Small Estate Act
Frequently, a decedent's estate becomes entitled to payments
such as a partial refund of a health insurance premium, a federal
or state tax refund, or a small debt owed to the decedent. If the
payor is aware that the decedent has died, he or she will almost
always insist on making the refund payable to the decedent's es-
tate. In the past, this situation would have required the benefi-
ciaries to choose between undertaking a formal administration
and forgoing collection of the amount due. Fortunately, the 2015
General Assembly amended the Small Estate Act to cover these
situations.6' Now, a designated successor who presents an affida-
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id. § 64.2-1411(E) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
61. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 617, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-601 (Cum. Supp. 2015)). Note that this new provision applies only to
assets claimed under Virginia Code section 64.2-601, which requires the entire personal
probate estate to be $50,000 or less, and not to individual assets of $25,000 or less claimed
under the small asset provision of Virginia Code section 64.2-602. See supra Part I.F.
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-601 (Cum. Supp. 2015), with id. § 64.2-602 (Cum. Supp.
2015).
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vit under the Small Estate Act may endorse or negotiate a small
asset that is a check, draft, or other negotiable instrument paya-
ble to the decedent's estate, just as the successor can already do
with an instrument payable to the decedent.62 This change will be
a great help to the beneficiaries of small estates.
H. Payment of Funds into Court
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections 8.01-
600 and 8.01-606, relating to court orders directing the clerk to
hold funds.63 Where judgment is taken in the circuit court, the
amendment simply confirms that the court, upon motion of a par-
ty for good cause shown, may enter an order directing the clerk to
hold related monies.' Where judgment is taken in the general
district court, the court, upon motion of a party for good cause
shown, may order its clerk to hold funds in escrow for up to 180
days to enable the party to request that the circuit court clerk re-
ceive and hold the funds.65 If the requesting party does not fur-
nish a copy of a circuit court order to the general district court
clerk within the 180-day period, the latter clerk must notify the
parties that the funds will be disbursed to the prevailing general
district court party within thirty days after the notice."
I. Revisiting the Disposition of Dead Bodies
Few estate-related subjects have received more attention from
the General Assembly in recent years than the proper disposition
of dead bodies.67 2015 was no different; the General Assembly
clarified or expanded several relevant statutory provisions.68
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-601 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
63. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 633, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-600, -606(C) (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-600(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
65. Id. § 8.01-606(C) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
66. Id.
67. Act of Mar. 27, 2014, ch. 355, 2014 Va. Acts __ - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2818.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014); codified at id. § 54.1-2807.02 (Cum. Supp.
2014)); Act of Mar. 7, 2014, ch. 228, 2014 Va. Acts -_, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 32.1-298 (Cum. Supp. 2014), 54.1-2807, -2818.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014); codified at id.
§§ 32.1-309.1 to -309.4 (Cum. Supp. 2014)); Act of Mar. 14, 2013, 2013 Va. Acts 620, 620-
21 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-288(B), (F) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
68. See Act of Mar. 27, 2015, ch. 670, 2015 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
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The revisions clarified that the statutory provisions for the dis-
position of dead bodies apply to burials, interments, entomb-
ments, cremations, and any other "authorized disposition of a
dead body permitted by law."69 The term "next of kin" now specifi-
cally includes certain individuals "aged 18 years or older" rather
than only those "over 18 years of age."" If the deceased cannot be
identified or the next of kin notified, the revisions expressly per-
mit notification of any other person authorized by law to make
arrangements for disposition of the decedent's remains, and they
authorize that person to claim the body.' If the next of kin or his
representative fails or refuses to provide visual identification of a
decedent whose remains are to be cremated, any other adult may
do so.72 If the decedent's identity and last residence are known,
responsibility for notifying the next of kin shifts from the primary
law enforcement agency for the locality in which the person or in-
stitution having initial custody of the body is located to the corre-
sponding agency in the jurisdiction where the decedent resided.3
Subsequent responsibility for disposing of an unclaimed body
likewise depends on whether the decedent's identity and last res-
idence are known.74
II. CASES AND OPINIONS
A. Authority of Surviving Co-Administrator
In Bartee v. Vitocruz, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether an estate administrator had authority to file a wrongful
death suit after the death of his co-administrator.75 The facts were
simple: two administrators qualified on an estate, but one died
before they could file a wrongful death action on behalf of the es-
tate.6 The other proceeded to file the suit, but the trial court
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-309.1, -309.2 (Cum. Supp. 2015), 54.1-2800, -2818.1 (Cum. Supp.
2015)); Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 658, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-309.1, -309.2 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-309.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
70. See id. Compare id. § 54.1-2800 (Cum. Supp. 2015), with id. (Repl. Vol. 2013).
71. Id. § 32.1-309.1(C), (D) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
72. Id. § 54.1-2818.1 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
73. Id. § 32.1-309.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
74. Id. § 32.1-309.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
75. 288 Va. 106, 108, 758 S.E.2d 549, 549 (2014).
76. Id. at 108-09, 758 S.E.2d at 549-50.
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ruled that he lacked standing to sue without his co-
administrator-even though the court clerk had refused his re-
quest to requalify as sole administrator, saying he had the au-
thority, as the surviving administrator, to act alone.77
Faced with this "Catch-22," the administrator appealed, argu-
ing that the doctrine of survivorship authorized him to maintain
the wrongful death action as sole remaining co-administrator.78
Finding no Virginia authority on point, the court applied a three-
part analysis based on Virginia statutes and case law.7 ' First, it
noted that the co-administrator was deceased and that his per-
sonal representative did not succeed to his authority as adminis-
trator, so there was no other party who could be joined as a party
plaintiff. ° Second, the court noted that the office of administrator
was not vacant, so no other appointment could be made until a
vacancy existed.8 Third, the court found that Virginia Code sec-
tion 64.2-517, which expressly applies the survivorship doctrine
to co-executors and co-administrators c.t.a., does not limit appli-
cation of the doctrine to those specific fiduciaries, but instead ex-
ists only for the purpose of alerting testators of the doctrine so
that they may provide otherwise in their wills if they do not wish
it to apply to their chosen personal representatives.82 The court
therefore concluded that the sole remaining administrator was
empowered to file the wrongful death suit."
B. Effect of Shareholder Agreement on Estate Plan
Sometimes courts reach the right decision but raise unwelcome
questions in the process. Such is the case with Jimenez v. Corr.
84
This appeal considered whether a deceased shareholder's bequest
of stock to her revocable trust was a permitted transfer under the
shareholders' agreement, or whether the stock was subject to a
mandatory sale provision contained in that same agreement.8'
77. Id. at 109, 758 S.E.2d at 550.
78. Id. at 110, 758 S.E.2d at 550.
79. Id. at 110-13, 758 S.E.2d at 551-52.
80. Id. at 111, 758 S.E.2d at 551.
81. Id. at 112, 758 S.E.2d at 551-52.
82. Id. at 112-13, 758 S.E.2d at 552.
83. Id. at 113, 758 S.E.2d at 552.
84. 288Va. 395, 764 S.E.2d 115 (2014).
85. Id. at 402, 764 S.E.2d at 117.
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Mrs. Corr's will poured her residuary estate, including shares
in a closely held corporation, over to a trust for her three chil-
dren.86 The will authorized the executors to distribute directly to a
trust beneficiary any property that otherwise would pass into the
trust and then immediately from the trust to that beneficiary.87
The trust instrument created three separate, equal shares which
Mrs. Corr's children could withdraw at any time, but it gave her
son a ninety-day option to purchase all of the shares from the
trust.88 The son and a son-in-law served as co-trustees.8 9
Several years after executing her will and revocable trust, Mrs.
Corr, her son, and her daughter entered into a shareholder
agreement hat generally obligated a shareholder's personal rep-
resentative to sell her shares to the company or to the remaining
shareholders upon the death of the shareholder." An exception
allowed a shareholder to "convey or bequeath" shares during life-
time or at death to "immediate family," defined as the sharehold-
er's spouse, children, parents, and siblings.9' Trusts were not in-
cluded among the permitted transferees.9'
When Mrs. Corr's son purported to exercise his purchase option
under the trust instrument, her daughter sought a judgment de-
claring that the shareholder agreement did not permit the shares
to be transferred to a trust and therefore that the mandatory pur-
chase provision of the agreement-and not the son's purchase op-
tion under the trust-should apply.9" The circuit court held, how-
ever, that the shareholder agreement did not prevent the shares
from passing according to the will and trust and that the son had
properly exercised his purchase option.94
Considering the daughter's appeal and the effect of the transfer
restrictions in the shareholders' agreement, the court observed
that a trust is not a separate legal entity like a corporation, but
instead is "a fiduciary relationship between already existing par-
86. Id. at 405-06, 764 S.E.2d at 118-19.
87. Id. at 405, 764 S.E.2d at 119.
88. Id. at 406-07, 764 S.E.2d at 119-20.
89. See id. at 402, 406, 764 S.E.2d at 117, 119.
90. Id. at 408-09, 764 S.E.2d at 120-21.
91. Id. at 409-10, 764 S.E.2d at 121.
92. See id. at 412, 764 S.E.2d at 123.
93. See id. at 403, 764 S.E.2d at 117.
94. Id. at 403, 764 S.E.2d at 118.
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ties," each of whom has certain legal rights, and is "simply a
method to transfer property to another party."95 It then looked
through the trust to determine whether the parties who had in-
terests in the decedent's trust were members of her immediate
family.96
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that, while a beneficiary
has equitable title, "a trustee's legal interest is more than nomi-
nal," citing a trustee's broad powers under the Virginia Uniform
Trust Code.97 It concluded that the pourover of shares from Mrs.
Corr's estate to her trust would comply with the shareholders'
agreement only if the trustees and the trust beneficiaries all qual-
ified as members of her immediate family, since "both a trustee
and a beneficiary have a substantial ownership interest in trust
property."98 Under that standard, the pourover violated the terms
of the shareholders' agreement; while all of the trust beneficiaries
were the decedent's children, one of the trustees was a son-in-law,
who was not included in the shareholders' definition of "immedi-
ate family."99
The son argued that the executor's ability to distribute proper-
ty directly to the children, bypassing the trust, meant that the
trustee's relationship to the decedent should not be a factor in the
court's analysis.100 The court, however, noted that the executor
was authorized to distribute only assets that otherwise would
pass "immediately" to a trust beneficiary.' It held that the
shares could not pass immediately to the trust beneficiaries due
to the son's ninety-day purchase option, and therefore the execu-
tor could not distribute them directly to the beneficiaries.°
The son next argued that the restriction in the shareholder
agreement was unenforceable because it did not specify who
would purchase the shares or how many each party would pur-
chase.0 3 The court acknowledged that the agreement provided for
95. Id. at 410-11, 764 S.E.2d at 122.
96. Id. at 412, 764 S.E.2d at 122.
97. Id. at 412, 764 S.E.2d at 123.
98. Id. at 412, 764 S.E.2d at 122-23.
99. Id. at 412-13, 764 S.E.2d at 123.
100. Id. at 413, 764 S.E.2d at 123.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 413-14, 764 S.E.2d at 124.
103. Id. at 415, 764 S.E.2d at 124-25.
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many possible outcomes, but found that it nonetheless "estab-
lished a mechanism to provide certainty . . . .""' The court there-
fore remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
finding that the shareholder agreement, not the will and trust,
governed the disposition of Mrs. Corr's shares.'
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia reached the correct
result, it appears to have misconstrued the nature of the trust re-
lationship. A testamentary pourover to the trustees of a trust is
not a "conveyance or bequest" to the trust beneficiaries; rather it
is a conveyance or bequest for their benefit. Mrs. Corr's revocable
trust already existed when the family entered into the sharehold-
ers' agreement.0 6 Had they intended to permit transfers to it or
any other trust, they could have easily included language to that
effect in the shareholders' agreement. In fact, prior to Jimenez,
the assumption of many drafters would likely have been that
trusts, partnerships, or other "look through" entities are not per-
mitted transferees unless expressly provided for in the agree-
ment. Thus, as a result of Jimenez, drafters are cautioned to re-
view existing shareholder agreements and similar agreements,
and to amend them if necessary to indicate clearly whether trans-
fers to trusts are permitted.
C. Removal of Executor
In Pettit v. Pettit, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether the two-year general statute of limitations under Virgin-
ia Code section 8.01-248, as applied to claims against an attorney-
in-fact, effectively prevented the removal of an executor who had
previously served as the decedent's agent under a durable power
of attorney."
7
In this case, two siblings brought suit to remove their brother
as executor of their father's estate, alleging that as executor he
had breached his fiduciary duty to investigate certain actions that
he had taken as their father's agent."8 The circuit court sustained
the executor's special plea in bar that the suit was time-barred
104. See id. at 415-16, 764 S.E.2d at 125.
105. Id. at 416, 764 S.E.2d at 125-26.
106. See id. at 408, 764 S.E.2d at 120.
107. No. 130508, slip op. at 1-2 (Va. Mar. 7, 2014) (unpublished decision).
108. Id. at 1.
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under the general statute of limitations because all of the actions
the plaintiffs sought to question had occurred more than two
years before the suit was filed."9
The siblings had argued below that the limitations period was
tolled under Virginia Code section 8.01-229(D) (relating to ob-
structing the filing of an action) due to the brother's failure to re-
sign or to bring a claim against himself on behalf of the estate.110
They also argued that an action to remove an executor is purely
equitable and therefore is governed by the doctrine of laches ra-
ther than by any specific statute of limitations."'
On appeal, the court noted that even if the removal suit were
governed by laches, the parties had admitted that the specific ac-
tions the siblings challenged were governed by the two-year stat-
ute of limitations."' With no claims remaining for a successor
personal representative to assert, the court found no reason to
remove the executor."' The Supreme Court of Virginia therefore
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court."4
D. Qualification for Inventory and Settlement Waiver
In an opinion to the clerk of the Roanoke Circuit Court, the At-
torney General of Virginia concluded that Virginia Code section
64.2-1302 allows the clerk to waive inventory and settlement for a
creditor who qualifies on a decedent's personal estate valued at
$25,000 or less only if the creditor's claim exceeds the value of the
estate."" By contrast, heirs and beneficiaries may qualify irre-
spective of the value of their shares of the estate."6 The proof that
a creditor must furnish regarding the estate's value and the value
of the creditor's claim is a matter within the clerk's discretion."7
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 3-4.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 4-5.
115. 2014 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 173, 173-74.
116. Id. at 174.
117. Id.
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